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Abstract 
Problem gambling is conventionally defined by the score in a specific questionnaire 
exceeding some critical value and data suggests is that 0.7% of adults in the UK 
could be afflicted. However, the literature has not evaluated the size of the harm 
associated with such an affliction and this research evaluates the effect of problem 
gambling on self-reported well-being which, together with a corresponding effect of 
income on well-being, allows us to construct a money-metric of the (self) harm 
associated with being a problem gambler. Our estimates suggest that problem 
gambling imposes a very large reduction in individual well-being.   
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This research is concerned with evaluating the costs associated with being a “problem 
gambler”. Problem gambling is usually defined by aggregating responses across questions 
which are embedded within a screen. When administered to large samples of individuals this 
facilitates an estimate of the prevalence of problem gambling.  An individual is then defined 
as a problem gambler (PG=1) if that individual’s score on the screen exceeds some critical 
value. There are several such screens used in this literature and they each contain questions 
that are designed to detect behaviour associated with pathological gambling and/or gambling 
harms. Our estimate for the UK, that there are perhaps around ⅓ m of 46m UK adults who 
are assessed to be problem gamblers is typical of the literature. However, none of the 
extensive literature that attempts to quantify the prevalence of problem gambling has 
attempted to also quantify the costs that problem gambling imposes on the individuals 
afflicted by it, and this is the main contribution of this paper. Our baseline estimate of the 
aggregate loss in well-being associated with PG is in approximately £90 thousand per 
problem gambler, or over £30 billion pa across the population as a whole – a figure that is the 
same order of magnitude as that often associated with alcohol abuse, and even exceeds 
overall gambling expenditures1.  
Gambling is an important part of many economies. Expenditure net of winnings 
(sometimes referred to as Gross Gambling Yield, GGY) in the UK 2014/5 is close to £12 
billion pa, or 0.6% of GNP; and overall expenditure is close to £50b or more then 2.5% of 
GNP. Relative to other “sins”, gambling is typically not highly taxed; and taxes have been 
driven downward as regulators and tax authorities have struggled with the increasingly 
footloose nature of the industry that is becoming more highly dominated by online, and often 
offshore, provision. Consumers in the UK do not directly pay tax on gambling - with the 
exception of the products sold by the National Lottery, sales of which are taxed at 12% plus a 
levy for “good causes” of approximately 28%. Other suppliers pay 15% on “profits”, defined 
as revenue minus winnings2. The motivation for sin taxes is driven by the notion that 
                                                          
1 The Gambling Commission estimate of GGY (bets minus winnings) on gambling is £13.6b for 2015/15. 
HMRC reports tax revenue of £2.1 billion for 2014/15, and the Gambling Commission reports further good 
causes revenue from the National Lottery portfolio of games of £3.8 billion. The Institute of Alcohol Studies 
estimates of the harms associated with alcohol abuse in the UK is in the order of £21b pa. This estimate 
aggregates effects associated with crime, absenteeism, and health. The IAS reports results that include wider 
harms that aggregate to over £50b pa. Tax revenue from alcohol is approximately £10b p.a. 
2 In the case of FOBTs (Fixed odds betting terminals), that are thought to be particularly likely to generate PG, 
the tax is 25%. 
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consumption causes harm that is not internalised. But these harms are often largely self-
inflicted, sometimes uncertain, and often long-term, in which case penal levels of tax need to 
be motivated by other considerations associated with behavioural deficiencies in individual 
preferences. Indeed, whether to legalise and tax the consumption of some commodities, as 
opposed to criminalise, has been analysed by Becker et al (2006) who show that the demand 
and supply elasticities as well as the nature of harms, play an important role in the optimal 
design of policy. Thus, our contribution here speaks to one of the critical parameters relevant 
to the design of public policy relevant to potentially harmful products.  
Our analysis exploits the availability of data on well-being in a large household 
sample survey. We construct a financial measure of PG by estimating the relationship 
between subjective well-being, PG, and income. The methodology draws on the seminal 
work on “happiness” and a particularly good early exemplar is Clarke and Oswald (2002). 
The method effectively scales the effect of PG on well-being by the effect of income on well-
being to monetize the estimate of PG on well-being. This well-being approach is a catch-all 
one – it looks, not at the mediating mechanisms, but directly at the effect on the well-being of 
individuals, irrespective of how that comes about.  The results are dramatic: our baseline 
estimate is that the harm associated with PG is close to £100,000 pppa which, for ⅓ of a 
million PGs, amounts to over £30 billion pa. 
However, there are a number of threats to the legitimacy of the well-being 
methodology that are typically not addressed in that literature. In particular, measurement 
error and other sources of endogeneity are usually ignored by the simple regression method 
that is used to obtain the statistical estimates. Measurement error in PG inevitably understates 
the effect of PG on well-being.3 On the other hand, PG might be symptom of low well-being 
rather than the other way around. This reverse causality is likely to bias the estimate of PG on 
well-being upward. Since these biases counteract each other, it is unclear what the net effect 
would be – the true effect might be larger or smaller than our baseline results. 
We attempt to tackle these endogeneity issues head-on using an instrumental variables 
(IV) approach. We find implausibly large estimates that suggest even larger losses in 
aggregate well-being than our simple headline results – perhaps double what our baseline 
                                                          
3 To make things more complicated, measurement error in income is likely to understate the effect of income on 
well-being – and since it is used to scale the effect of PG on well-being this will tend to overstate the financial 
effect of the loss in well-being associated with PG. 
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estimates suggest. We would need a substantially larger dataset to come to any firm 
conclusions. For the moment we treat our OLS estimates as a plausible benchmark. 
An alternative approach to the investigation of well-being data would consider the 
effect of PG on a list of all relevant mediators – for example, in the case of PG, researchers 
may look at the effect on mental health, employment, wages (a measure of productivity in the 
labour market) conditional on employment, tax receipts and welfare payments etc. The 
predicted effects would then need to be “valued” and aggregated4. A recent UK example is 
Thorley et al (2016) which focuses on those outcomes that affect some of the range of other 
people and agencies, apart from the PG. That study, from IPPR, focuses on only certain 
aspects of health, housing, crime, and welfare and employment, and provides estimates of a 
cost of just £1.2b pa. This alternative methodology is likely to miss elements of the 
transmission mechanism, perhaps because of limitations in the available data. This method is 
also more likely to miss true externalities - effects of one person’s PG on other people (this is 
not measured in the IPPR study, for example). The well-being method is less likely to be 
affected by this – since it will capture the effects of own PG on other people to the extent that 
the former feels altruistic towards the latter.5 In any event, the well-being method seems 
likely to yield bigger estimates than the alternative to the extent that the latter embraces only 
a subset of possible mediators.  
Nonetheless, our own analysis is deficient in that it has no policy content over and 
above highlighting the magnitude of the problem. To address how to ameliorate the problem 
we need to uncover the transmission mechanism that links PG to (much lower) well-being. 
The most obvious contenders are gambling expenditure and gambling losses and we attempt  
quantify their role once we have established the magnitude of the problem. However, we can 
see that gambling expenditure in our data is heavily underreported, with the exception of 
scratchcards and lotto. Our finding of no effect of overall gambling spend on the impact that 
PG has on well-being is likely to be a manifestation of the measurement error in the data. 
However, we find that lotto are accurately measured in our data, we estimate that scratchcard 
spending does have a statistically significant mediating role, but not the spending on lotteries.  
                                                          
4 An exhaustive report on the Australian gambling market by Delfabbro (2010) for the Australian Productivity 
Commission (APC) reviews the literature on a wide variety of harms associated with PG (ch 3) and comments 
on the APC’s own attempt (Australian Productivity Commission, 2010) to aggregate harms and compare with 
consumer surplus benefits (ch 6). 
5 Our attempts to estimate the effects of PG on the well-being of spouses yielded small and imprecise estimates. 
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2. Related literature 
There is a considerable literature on problem gambling. All of the quantitative work 
uses one or more of a number of screens that consist of a set of questions that are thought to 
be indicative of PG. An overview of the problem gambling literature is provided by Orford et 
al (2003), which exploits the Gambling Prevalence Surveys (GPS) that pre-date the 2010 
GPS used in our analysis. Griffiths provides an updated review of the British literature in 
Griffiths (2014), which includes analysis of the 2010 GPS data used here, as well as 
providing wider international comparisons. The British GPS is one of a small number of 
random sample surveys of populations that have been conducted in the world for this purpose 
– many samples elsewhere are drawn from specific subsets of the population. Indeed, Britain 
has had three such surveys although the changes across years have been small and the 
samples are not large enough to have the power to reject stability of the prevalence of 
problem gambling across time. For the 2010 dataset used here Griffiths argues that 
“…problem gambling in Great Britain is a minority problem that effects less than 1% of the 
British population…”, and that “Problem gambling also appears to be less of a problem than 
many other potentially addictive behaviours”6.  
Related research does consider the public health consequences of gambling which 
looks at specific outcomes in a piecemeal fashion. An excellent early overview is by Shaffer 
and Korn (2002) which candidly confesses that the causal effect of gambling on adverse 
outcomes such as mental health, crime, domestic violence, etc. cannot be distinguished from 
the correlations, even though some of these correlations are large. Establishing that an effect 
of gambling on any of these outcomes is causal is likely to be problematic. Establishing the 
causal effect on all possible outcomes is likely to be considerably harder. The well-being 
approach offers a practical and legitimate way of condensing the problem into a univariate 
outcome. 
However, none of the extensive PG literature that focusses on measuring the 
prevalence of PG makes any attempt to uncover the size of the problem that PG generates for 
those people who are afflicted. So this literature is seriously incomplete. Only Forrest (2016), 
                                                          
6 Here, Griffiths is referring to Sussman et al (2011) who surveyed the prevalence of other addictions and found 
that addictions to alcohol, cigarette smoking, illicit drugs, work, and shopping appear to have a prevalence rate 
of around 5% to 15% of the population.  
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who also uses the 2010 GPS that we employ in our own empirical work here, draws any 
attention to this issue.7  
The precise question asked in the GPS data was “Taking all things together, on a scale 
of 1 to 10, how happy would you say you are these days?” Deaton and Stone (2013) refer to 
measures of well-being such as that in the GPS as “evaluative” and they report that there is a 
stable relationship in the literature between such evaluative measures of well-being and log 
income, with a coefficient that is typically around ½ - implying that a 100% increase in 
income would raise well-being by ½.8 The methodology estimates well-being regressions 
using large random samples of individuals, and the relative coefficients of income and of the 
life event in question are used to provide a financial ‘compensating amount’ for that event. 
The method has been used to evaluate the effects of marital status, unemployment, health, 
and many other phenomena.9  
Forrest (2016) reports a large difference in mean well-being for PG vs non-PG 
individuals in the GPS data10. He goes on to investigate the other correlates of well-being in 
the 2010 GPS data, including income intervals and many other control variables. He reports 
estimates that suggest that the effect of PG is strongly and significantly negative. While he 
does not report the implied effect of income because of the grouped nature the data, he does 
demonstrate that the effect of PG on W is comparable with the effect of divorce and 
widowhood, relative to married. However, it seems likely that several of the control variables 
that Forrest includes represent “bad controls”: variables that are themselves endogenous and 
whose presence results in biased coefficients of the PG variable and/or those on income 
                                                          
7 While Forrest (2016) does not report the effect of problem gambling on well-being he does report that 
gambling that is not problematic increases well-being by 0.2 points, on the 1 to 10 scale. We fail to find a 
statistically significant effect in our specification using the same data. 
8 If we interpreted the coefficient on log-income in the relationship between well-being and log income as a 
coefficient of a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) expected utility function then it would be within the 
ballpark of estimates from other methodologies. For example, Hartley et al (2013) estimate the CRRA using a 
sample of gameshow players in an environment where players might win a wide range of amounts. Their well-
determined estimate of risk aversion would be consistent with a coefficient on log income of 1. 
9 Powdthavee and van den Berg (2011) use the well-being method to evaluate the effect of a variety of medical 
conditions on several measures of well-being. However, they do not consider the issues we raise above which 
are likely to bias the results in different ways for different well-being measures. An excellent review of the 
issues around the use of subjective well-being measures can be found in Nikilova (2016), albeit in the context of 
development. 
10 Since 2010 the DSM and PGSI screens used in the GPS surveys have instead been incorporated in the Health 
Survey of England (HSE), which does not contain well-being questions. 
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intervals11. For example, education, income, employment, self-reported health, and marital 
status are all arguably endogenous; and they are likely correlated with PG as well as with 
income and well-being. It is unclear what the direction of bias associated with including such 
bad controls would be on the PG or income coefficients.  
In addition to the bad controls problem, which we address here, there are strong 
grounds for thinking that PG itself is measured with error. It is, after all, self-reported and 
individuals may wish to conceal their problem from the interviewer if not from themselves. 
Moreover, PG itself, even if it is not subject to measurement error, is likely to be endogenous 
because both PG and well-being may be correlated with some unobservable factors that are 
not explicitly included in the modelling - for example, with non-cognitive traits such as self-
control. Or, PG might cause low well-being at the same time as low well-being causes PG.  
Resolving this endogeneity issue is crucial for being able to put a causal interpretation to the 
estimated relationship between PG and well-being in observational data. We need a causal 
estimate of the effect of PG, rather than a simple correlation, since our objective is to obtain 
estimates that will help policymakers understand the consequences of a policy-induced 
change in PG. 
Moreover, a common weakness of the existing literature is that income is typically 
measured with error and this will tend to attenuate the coefficient on income in a well-being 
equation. Since the money metric associated with the event in question will vary inversely 
with the estimate of the effect of income on well-being this attenuation in the latter will 
inflate the metric. Powdthavee (2010) appears to be the only paper to suggest how important 
this problem is. He convincingly corrects for the measurement error in income, in the 
relationship between income and well-being in the British Household Panel Study data, using 
information on whether the interviewer saw the payslip of household members. Using this as 
an instrumental variable for log income did indeed result in a large and statistically 
significant increase in the estimated effect of log income.  
A further concern relates to the idea of “rational addiction” pioneered by Becker and 
Murphy (1988). They proposed a forward looking model of addiction where agents respond 
to expected changes in future prices/costs as well as to current ones, and where current 
consumption affects the marginal utility of future consumption. If this model were a true 
                                                          
11 The bad controls problem is discussed in section 3.2.3 of Angrist and Pischke (2009). 
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description of behaviour, and the well-being measure was an accurate metric of lifecycle 
well-being, then we would expect to observe no well-being effect of PG.  
The theory was widely criticised for not being able to explain the empirical 
observation of the widespread regret expressed by addicts. In fact, this is not a valid criticism 
of the theory – it is quite possible that addicts, once addicted feel currently worse of than they 
would have been had they not decided originally that the discounted lifetime benefits exceed 
the lifetime discounted costs. Moreover, extensions of the original theory, by Orphanides and 
Zervos (1995) and Gruber and Koszegi (2001), allows for the possibility that individuals 
experience imperfect foresight or time inconsistency over their potential to become addicted. 
Individuals, in these extensions to the theory, still optimally make forward looking decisions 
but are nonetheless allowed to ultimately regret those decisions because they may have 
underestimated the ease with which they become addicted, or the present value costs of that 
addiction. 
Finally, the strong effect of PG on well-being begs the question of what mediating 
factors are involved in the underlying transmission mechanism. Most evaluation work 
focusses on the “total” effect of some “treatment”, rather than on the underlying “channels” 
that drive the effect. Evaluation work does not usually investigate the possibility that the total 
effect may be driven by specific channels that relate to “mediating” variables that affect the 
final outcome. Here, we tentatively explore the role of gambling expenditures/losses and we 
distinguish between draw-based lotto and scratchcard games–style games, and other forms of 
gambling. It is not surprising, in the light of the lacuna around the magnitude of the harm that 
PG implies, that the literature is again silent on the potential role that mediating factors might 
play in determining this unknown magnitude. However, if we were able to establish the 
mediation effects then we would at least be able to say something about the likely size of the 
taxes that might be required to trigger the behavioural changes required since there is a (very 
small) literature on gambling price elasticties – a literature that has recently been surveyed by 
Frontier Economics (2014). Moreover, since the marketplace for gambling products is far 
from being competitive it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the relatively concentrated 
nature of supply, and the low marginal cost of the products supplied, would yield elasticities 
that are probably close to -1. Given this, there are grounds for optimism that changes in the 
structure of gambling taxation might be used to change behaviour to reduce harms. We  




Our dataset is the British Gambling Prevalence Survey (BGPS) 2010. An excellent 
overview of the content and construction of the BGPS is provided by Wardle et al (2011). 
BGPS contains two PG screens: DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders) IV and PGSI (Problem Gambling Severity Index)12. We focus our attention on the 
DSM screen here because it has been used to make a very clear distinction between PG and 
non-PG – while PGSI distinguishes between degrees of problem gambling13. Table 1a 
describes the sample sizes. It is clear that PG afflicts a small minority of the population: just 
0.55% according to PGSI and 0.72% according to DSM. The British adult population (16+ 
for lotto gambling purposes) is approximately 45 million so these percentages correspond to 
approximately ¼ and ⅓ million people respectively. The two PG screens contain different 
numbers of questions and are scored differently: PG=1 is defined as a score on DSM>2, or as 
a score on PGSI>7. More detail on the screens is provided in Appendix B.   
Table 1b gives a breakdown of the data: gamblers who are PG, gamblers who are not 
PG, and non-gamblers. It is clear that problem gamblers are much more likely to be male, 
young, single (never married), Asian or Black (although cell sizes are tiny here). While they 
have 10% higher personal income, they live in households that are 12% poorer. Moreover 
they spend fourteen times as much as the gambling non-PG group and they experience a 
level of well-being that is approximately a standard deviation lower.  
Figure 1 very clearly shows the highly left skewed distributions of scores for both 
screens, and Figure 2 shows a scatterplot of the two (where, for clarity, we omit the 93% of 
individuals who score zero on both screens). Only 28 individuals are classified as PG=1 for 
both screens, and only 60 individuals are classified as PG=1 for at least one screen. Precision 
is always an empirical issue, but such is the low proportion of PG in the data that even the 
BGPS sample is unlikely to be sufficiently large to provide the power to reliably estimate the 
effects of PG on well-being in the population if they are small. Of course, if the effects were 
small then we would not need to worry about them.  
                                                          
12 We assume, throughout, that all non-gamblers are not problem gamblers so we recode non-gamblers from 
missing to PG=0. This assumption makes no difference to our subsequent econometric results or the welfare 
inferences that we make, although the Forrest (2014) specification does find a small positive effect of non-
problem gambling on well-being. 
13 DSM V, developed after the GPS 2010 survey was conducted, now also distinguishes between problem 
(scoring 3-4) and pathological (5+) gambling behaviour. Since well-being seems to be almost constant for 
scores above 2 this distinction in DSM V seems likely to be relatively unimportant. 
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Table 1a  Sample Breakdown 
 DSM 
PGSI                  No  problem Problem gambler Total 
No problem 6474 6 6480 
Low risk 330 3 333 
Moderate risk 78 13 91 
Problem gambler 10 28 38 
Total 6892 50 6942 










Wellbeing Score, 1-10 7.868 7.949 6.240 7.916 
 (1.9915) (1.8491) (2.6462) (1.8982) 
Personal Income, £ pa 14,904.64 15,842.07 17,547.08 15,616.66 
 (9,332.521) (9,065.814) (10,522.33) (9,153.726) 
Household Income, £ pa 28,781.91 29,842.58 28,020.13 29,560.56 
 (16,868.25) (15,862.56) (15,037.04) (16,121.37) 
Gambling Spend, £ pm 0 21.979 308.07 18.467 
  (76.0745) (598.6111) (86.6464) 
Female=1 0.579 0.531 0.200 0.541 
 (0.4939) (0.4991) (0.4041) (0.4983) 
Age, years 51.606 49.508 37.600 49.953 
 (18.3987) (16.9282) (14.2628) (17.3456) 
Ethnicity:     
White 0.852 0.953 0.820 0.927 
 (0.3545) (0.2107) (0.3881) (0.2604) 
Mixed Ethnicity 0.014 0.006 . 0.008 
 (0.1184) (0.0799)  (0.0910) 
Asian/Asian British 0.082 0.019 0.120 0.036 
 (0.2742) (0.1382) (0.3283) (0.1863) 
Black/Black British 0.043 0.017 0.060 0.024 
 (0.2034) (0.1276) (0.2399) (0.1523) 
Chinese/Other 0.008 0.004 . 0.005 
 (0.0889) (0.0638)  (0.0708) 
Marital Status:     
Married 0.654 0.670 0.520 0.665 
 (0.4759) (0.4701) (0.5047) (0.4720) 
Separated/Divorced 0.095 0.098 0.120 0.097 
 (0.2932) (0.2968) (0.3283) (0.2961) 
Single 0.173 0.163 0.360 0.167 
 (0.3782) (0.3690) (0.4849) (0.3726) 
Widowed 0.079 0.070 . 0.071 
 (0.2690) (0.2544)  (0.2574) 
Observations 1,760 5,132 50 6,941 
Notes: Std dev in parentheses. No observations is recorded as .. Personal and household income reported as 
fitted values from the interval regressions in Table A1. Gambling spend is the mid-points of the binned data. 
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Figure 2 Scatterplot of scores using DSM and PGSI screens 
 
Note: PG defined by DSM score >2 or PGSI>7. Bubble size shows proportion of sample. 
 
A near unique feature of the 2010 BGPS survey is it contains information, at the 
individual level, on well-being. This information is not available in the subsequent HSEs or 
in almost all of the similar surveys conducted elsewhere in the world. As reported above, 
well-being is recorded on a 1 to 10 integer scale and the distribution is shown in Figure 3 for 
those who are designated as problem gamblers (PG=1) by the DSM screen, and those not 
(PG=0). There is more than twice the proportion of PG=1 individuals who have well-being 
below 7 as there are PG=0 individuals. 
The relationship between well-being and the DSM score for defining problem 
gambling is presented in Figure 4. This is drawn with “jitter” to show more clearly how the 
data is distributed across these two integer-valued variables – more observations at intercises 
are indicated by denser blobs. The solid line shows a local polynomial regression and the 
grey area is the 95% confidence interval around this. It is clear that a score above 2 in DSM is 
indeed indicative of lower well-being, but there is no step-change at a score of 3, and the 
well-being gradient above 2 is not significantly different from zero.  However, even scores of 
1 or 2 also have a pronounced effect on well-being.14 The graph suggests that a score of 3 
compared to 0 reduces well-being by close to 2 units – a standard deviation. 
                                                          
14 Dummy variables for DSM=3, 4 ….10 in the well-being equations are jointly insignificantly different from 

















Figure 3 Distribution of well-being in GPS 
 
 
Note: No PG=1 observations record a well-being level of 9. 
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Income in BGPS is recorded at both the individual level, and at the household level, 
as net annual income and is coded into £5k bins. Since we require a continuous measure of 
income to be able to implement our well-being method we eschew the alternative of using a 
set of dummy variables to indicate which bin each individual belongs to. Moreover, because 
the income data is likely to be the object of measurement error, we estimate the relationship 
between (log) net household annual income and a number of explanatory variables, as an 
interval regression.15 This estimation methodology respects the grouped nature of the 
dependent variable and relies on the assumed log Normality of the income residuals to form a 
continuous relationship with the explanatory variables. Our selection of explanatory 
variables, and the use of log household income, is deliberately parsimonious and is inspired 
by the theory of human capital due to Becker (1964) and its empirical implementation in 
Mincer (1974), and in many hundreds of subsequent analyses of earnings16. Thus, we replace 
the log of the recorded grouped net income by its prediction from this interval regression. 
Appendix A Table A1 presents the empirical estimates of this interval regression. The 
estimates are very conventional with a large negative effect of female, a strong quadratic 
effect of age, and a strong positive effect of better educational qualifications and better 
health. The great virtue of interval regression is that it provides us with a continuous measure 
of net income and it resolves the measurement error problem in self-reported net income. 
Figure 5 shows the scatterplot (with “jitter” applied to allow us to see how many 
individuals are at each integer value in the graph from the density of the “blobs”) of predicted 
net household income (by exponentiating the predicted log) against well-being, and 
superimposes a local polynomial of the relationship between these two variables. This 
relationship is relatively flat but does show a significant monotonically increasing 
relationship that is concave over most of its range. If we think of this well-being vs income 
relationship as a (expected) utility function then the concave nature would be consistent with 
diminishing marginal utility of income. While there has been considerable controversy over 
                                                          
15 Another alternative is to use the midpoints of the income bins as the measure of income. Doing so makes no 
substantive difference to our findings – our money metric of lost wellbeing from problem gambling remains 
large and significant. However, since measurement error is not accounted for using this approach, the coefficient 
on household income simply becomes smaller, making our estimate of the cost of PG, even larger. 
16 We exploit the detailed information on education included in BGPS, as well as age, age-squared, gender, self-
assessed ethnicity, marital status, and an indicator of self-assessed health. Since our purpose in modelling 
income is to obtain a consistent prediction of the true level of income from the observed interval data we are not 
concerned with the exogeneity of the variables in this auxiliary equation. Variations in the precise specification 
of this interval regression make very little difference to our subsequent analysis. 
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inferring the marginal utility of income, a cardinal concept, from observed decisions made 
under uncertainty there is ample evidence in the literature that one can. For example, Hartley 
et al (2013) estimate a model of decision-making behaviour under uncertainty in a gameshow 
setting, which features a range of stakes from low to very high during the course of play. 
They find that behaviour is consistent with a utility of income relationship that is log linear. 
In their analysis, using a very different methodology from that used below, the coefficient on 
log income is found to be, very precisely, 1. Here, Figure 5 suggests that doubling income 
from, say, a log income level of 9.5 to 10.5 would indicate a rise in well-being of around ½ - 
which is close to what we estimate in the next section using conventional statistical analysis. 
Figure 5 Well-being and (predicted) net household annual net income  
  
4. Estimating the determinants of well-being 
This is a well-established well-being methodology for estimating the consequences of 
life events and this is outlined in Clarke and Oswald (2002). In its simplest incarnation, it 
starts from the presumption that there is some parametric relationship between well-being 
(Wi), income (Yi), the (discrete) event in question, which in our case is PGi, and a vector of 
control variables (Xi). This relationship may be summarized by Wi = W(Xi, Yi PGi) where the 
i subscript indicates individual i. When taken to the data, this is often specified as W being 
linear in X and PG, but often log linear in Y, and this is typically estimated by OLS. Thus, a 
typical model would be  
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 = 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊′𝜷𝜷 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖     (1) 
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where ui is the residual that captures variation in Wi that is not captured by the included 
variables. Thus, the difference in well-being associated with PGi = 1 rather than 0 is simply 
∆𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿. Since γ is the effect of a unit change in lnYi on well-being it follows that the same 
difference in W could be achieved by changing lnYi by an amount equal to δ/γ. This implies 
that δ/γ is the (percentage) change in Yi required to hold well-being at the level associated 
with not being a problem gambler for i. This proportionate difference in Yi is often referred to 
as the compensating variation (CV) – the percentage change in Yi required to compensate i 
for being PGi=1.  
 The methodology is not, however, without its critics. The first criticism stems from 
the fact that it is not at all clear that the scale of W from 1 to 10 can be given a cardinal 
interpretation. That is, the restriction that moving from 1 to 2 is as good (bad) as a move from 
4 to 5 is a strong one, impossible to verify, and hence difficult to rely on, in such data. It is 
just as plausible that the move from 1 to 2, thereby doubling W, can only be achieved for 
someone who has a W of 4 by moving to 8. It seems plausible that such a W measure could 
well be monotonically increasing in true well-being, but that only the ordinal property can be 
relied upon.  To investigate the robustness of our conclusions on the impact of PG we, in 
addition to estimating the conventional model where W is estimated by linear regression, also 
provide estimates under the assumption that lnW is linear, and we further use a Box-Cox 
estimation, which transforms the dependent variable in a way that nests both linear and log 




 = 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊′𝜷𝜷 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,     (2) 
where λ=1 corresponds to the linear special case and λ=0 to the log case. We show below that 
these alternative specifications make little difference to our PG money metric estimate.  
A critical contribution to the well-being methodology by Bond and Lang (2010) raises 
this ordinality issue. They note that since the W data is categorical, where the categories 
represent intervals along some continuous distribution, the implied CDFs of these 
distributions are likely to cross when estimated using large samples. Therefore, some 
monotonic transformation of the utility function, W(.)¸ can always reverse the ranking of 
overall well-being: for example, between the PG=1 group and the PG =0 group. Of course, 
more categories will help resolve this problem, that would not arise if W were continuous, but 
there is nothing to say that 10 categories is enough to ensure the reliability of the method.  A 
popular solution to this problem is to adopt a specification that only relies on the ordinal 
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nature of such well-being data. The simplest case is where one is prepared to assume that 
well-being is Normally distributed so that we can easily fix the cut-points between 1, 2, 3 etc. 
in which case we can estimate the means and variances of each group using Ordered Probit. 
In particular, we estimate 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
∗  = 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊′𝜷𝜷 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖     (3) 
where Wi = j if μj-1 < Wi* < μj, for j = 1,2,3,... 10, and ui is assumed to be Normal. Here μj are 
the unknown cutpoints that are estimated by exploiting the assumed Normality of ui. In order 
to compute the compensating variation in this ordered Probit case we need to transform the 
coefficients into marginal effects, to make them comparable to the OLS coefficients, and then 
cumulate the predicted probabilities across each of the levels of W, using the proportions 
reporting each level of W as weights. 
 The second criticism of the method is a practical one – that, in practice, PG, is 
measured with error. This will be true, not least, because PG is defined using self-reported 
responses to the questions in the screen that is employed; and we notice that the different 
screens produce different results (although insubstantially so). OLS estimates of δ, when PG 
is subject to measurement error (ME), will be attenuated – i.e. biased towards zero (i.e. 
downwards). The solution to a ME problem is to instrument with another measure (even one 
that is also measured with error). When the ME is classical then IV produces consistent 
estimates of δ. In practice, GMM estimation may be used to ensure consistency even if ME is 
non-classical (see Kane et al, 1999, and Light and Flores-Lagunes, 2006). Fortunately, the 
GPS data provides not just one screen for PG but two. Thus, we can instrument the PG 
variable, computed from one screen according to whether the score exceeds the critical value, 
with the score on the other screen. Indeed, the scores for each question within the alterative 
screen might be used to form many instruments; although here we continue to adopt a 
parsimonious approach and simply use the overall score from the alternate screen.  
 There remains one further criticism of this well-being methodology: one that is 
generally ignored in the well-being literature generally, but was, nonetheless, a question that 
was raised in Forrest (2104, 2016) in the present context of problem gambling. This criticism 
is that PGi is itself endogenous - that is, it is correlated with both ui and Wi perhaps because 
there are missing variables that confound the relationship. For example, in this context, 
individuals with low Wi, for reasons that are not observed and controlled for, may be more 
likely to have PGi=1. OLS estimation of δ will then be biased – upwards (downwards) if 
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cov(PGi,ui)>0 (<0) since δ will capture both the effect of PGi, and the effect of the 
unobservables that are correlated with both PGi and Wi . We might expect that low well-being 
types of people to be more likely to develop problem gambling (i.e. cov(PGi,ui) < 0) so OLS 
estimates of the PG coefficient would be biased upwards. The solution to this problem is 
again usually found through the use of instrumental variables. That is, we need to identify 
some variable, call it Zi, that affects PGi but only affects Wi through its effect on PGi – that is, 
there is no direct transmission between Zi and Wi.  
Forrest chooses not to pursue this on the grounds that the fact that PG and W is 
strongly correlated is sufficient to make even the OLS estimates of policy interest. This is a 
legitimate view – the strong correlation suggests that people who are PG=1 and have low W 
are worthy of the attention of policymakers. This view, that where there’s smoke there’s fire, 
is often taken in the epidemiology literature and is enshrined in the commonly adopted Hill’s 
Criteria (see Hill, 1965). However, if the policy objective is to raise W, at least for those with 
low W, there are likely to be much better ways of profiling for this than using PG– not least 
because PG=1 is so scarce that it is likely to miss the overwhelming majority of low W cases. 
Thus, we feel the case for relying on our OLS results without further investigation is weak. 
However, since PG is itself scare we will find it difficult to find a Z that is strongly correlated 
with it. Our candidate Z is parental PG -  sample members are asked whether one or both 
parents gambled regularly and, if so, whether the parent’s gambling was regarded as 
problematic. While this might well be correlated with own PG, a more difficult question to 
answer is whether we can be confident that parental PG has no direct effect on W. 
We are conscious that the definition of PG pays no regard to the financial transactions 
that underlie PG: that large amounts of money are, on average, lost through heavy gambling 
expenditure that Table 1b showed was many times higher for PG cases than for non-PG 
cases. All of the above addresses the effect of PG on well-being, but it is silent on how this 
effect happens. The methodology is not well-adapted to generate policy implications if it 
cannot tell us what the transmission mechanism through which PG impacts of W.  Therefore, 
we augment this standard well-being method with “mediation analysis”. This mediation 
analysis facilitates the decomposition of the effect of PG on well-being into a direct effect, 
and an effect that is mediated through the indirect channel of associated gambling 
expenditures. The mediation approach is to estimate a pair of linear equations – one for the 
mediator, that depends on the treatment (and covariates) and one for the outcome which 
depends on the mediator and the treatment (and covariates). Then the “direct effect” is 
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computed as the partial effect of treatment on the outcome (holding the mediator fixed), 
while the “indirect effect” is the product of the partial effect of treatment on the mediator, and 
the partial effect of the mediator on the outcome. Assuming a linear specification for both 
equations, (and no interaction between treatment and mediator) then a numerically equivalent 
strategy is to add the mediator to the model in (1) and measure the extent to which the 
treatment effect decreases relative to the estimate when the mediator is excluded (the 
“difference in coefficients” method).  Thus, if we denote our potential mediators as the vector 
of gambling expenditures, G, then the essence of mediation analysis is to estimate   
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 = 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊′𝜷𝜷 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑮𝑮𝒊𝒊′𝜽𝜽 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖     (4) 
where the direct effect is the estimate of δ from (4) and we define the indirect effect by 
subtracting this direct effect coefficient from the estimate of the same in (1).  
5. Results 
In our empirical implementation we deliberately adopt a parsimonious specification of 
the well-being equation for fear that including bad controls may bias the estimates of the 
coefficients on our variables of interest – problem gambling and log income. We include only 
those variables that we are reasonably confident are themselves exogenous: age, age2, gender, 
and indicators for marital status, and ethnicity.17  
5.1 Correlation analysis 
Our headline estimates of the parameters of interest, using OLS, are set out in Table 2 
and we set out to investigate the issue raised by Bond and Lang concerning how the ordinal 
nature of the data might be cardinalised. We compare a conventional specification, where the 
W ranking is used as the cardinalisation – so that W=4 is assumed to mean twice as good as 
W=2, which is twice as good as W=1 with a log-linear model where W is replaced by W’=lnW 
so that  W’=2 is assumed to mean twice as good as W’=1, but a value of 3 is twice as good as 
a value of 2.  The second column corresponds to such a log-linear cardinalisation. And the 
final column is known as the Box-Cox specification that nests the earlier two as specials 
cases. Note that the specifications differ only in the transformation of the dependent variable 
and so the ratio of any pair of coefficients will have the same interpretation across 
specifications. Thus, the interpretation of the parameter, δ/γ, remains legitimate across the 
                                                          
17 Experiments that also included or excluded marital status, ethnicity, region and, even, education made no 
substantive difference to our estimates of δ/γ so we do not think of these as “bad controls”. However, the results 
are sensitive to the inclusion of self-assessed health and we are reluctant to include this.  
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specifications – and the fact that they are very similar, and certainly not statistically different 
from each other, suggests that the overall welfare consequences are captured reasonably well 
by the simplest specification.18 It is not very surprising that the ratio of coefficients on 
explanatory variables is not greatly affected when the dependent variable alone is subjected 
to a monotonic transformation. 
Table 2: OLS estimated parameters of interest across cardinalisations 





Ln Y (𝜸𝜸) 0.442*** 0.0888*** 4.162*** 
 
(0.0546) (0.0112) (0.613) 
PG (𝜹𝜹) -1.408*** -0.293*** -13.77*** 
 
(0.366) (0.0885) (3.564) 
𝜹𝜹/𝜸𝜸 -3.186*** -3.298*** -3.308*** 
 (0.9285) (1.0876) (1.0003) 
CV (£b, pa) 31.2 32.3 32.4 
Notes: Corresponding results where PG is defined using the PGSI score are provided in the 
PGSI Appendix, Table A3. Female, age, age2, marital status, and ethnicity are included. 
Standard errors in parentheses ***/**/* indicates significance at 1%/5%/10%.  
Our headline welfare loss calculation multiplies the estimated δ/γ (of -3.2) by average 
annual household income, of almost £30k, to yield an annual loss for a household of average 
income of approximately £94k. Since the interpretation of this is the average effect, we can 
obtain the aggregate welfare loss by multiplying by the number of people with PG 
(approximately ⅓m) to yield a figure that is close to £31b.19  
The PG losses estimated above rely on an income coefficient that will be affected by 
measurement error in incomes. To sidestep this issue we appeal to Conlisk et al (2012) who 
suggest that one impose an extraneous estimate from the literature.  This, we re-estimated 
Table 2 imposing the coefficient on log income to be either unity (as in the gameshow study) 
or ½ (as in Deaton and Stone). The PG coefficient changed little under these constraints and 
the estimated implied financial losses from PG are slightly smaller in the case of ½ and less 
so in the case of assuming 1. We also re-estimated Table 2 using equivalised income to adjust 
for household size, n, whereby income is deflated by (1+n)0.7 and found that the income 
coefficient fell by around 20% but the PG coefficient remained almost unchanged. 
                                                          
18 The estimated value of λ is 2.72 with a standard error of 0.319 – which allows us to reject both extremes. 
19 When we drop non-gambler observations the results remain almost identical to those in Table 2. When we 
include a dummy variable for non-gamblers in Table 2 we find it to be statistically insignificant and the 
remaining coefficients do not change.   
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5.2 Causal analysis 
However, these results are contingent on the exogeneity of PG which we relax in 
Table 3. The first column corrects for measurement error in PG by exploiting the correlation 
between the DSM definition of PG and the score from the alternative screen. The Staiger and 
Stock (1997) rule of thumb that the first stage F statistic should exceed 10 is easily satisfied 
for the results in the first column of Table 3, suggesting that the PGSI score is a very strong 
instrument. The second column also includes parental PG in the instrument set in an attempt 
to deal with the second potential source of endogeneity.  The F statistic still satisfies the rule 
of thumb.  In each case, in Table 3, the PG coefficient is substantially larger than that in 
Table 2.  The crucial welfare effect, δ/γ, remains the same irrespective of the different 
instruments used - with the exception of column 3 which uses Parental PG alone as an IV. 
This does not produce as satisfactory an F in the first stage as the other cases - not 
surprisingly the estimate of δ becomes much larger because the first stage only features ten 
comliers, and it is common for the IV estimate to be even more biased than the OLS estimate 
in such cases. 










Ln Y (𝜸𝜸) 0.437*** 0.437*** 0.361*** 
 
(0.0526) (0.0570) (0.0841) 
PG (𝜹𝜹) -2.512*** -2.527*** -20.115** 
 
(0.6498) (0.6517) (9.5738) 
𝜹𝜹/𝜸𝜸 -5.750*** -5.788*** -55.767* 
 (1.6888) (1.6462) (34.5181) 
CV (£b, pa) 56.3 56.7 546 
First stage F 4904.66*** 1640.35*** 17.23*** 
Notes: Corresponding results where PG is defined using the PGSI score are provided in the 
PGSI Appendix, Table A3. Female, age, age2, marital status, and ethnicity are included as 
control variables. Estimated standard errors, obtained from bootsrapping, are in parentheses. 
***/**/* indicates statistically significant at 1%/5%/10%. F is the Stock-Yogo definition – 





Forrest (2016) is rightly suspicious of the ability of the GPS data to yield a valid 
instrument for PG. Wardle et al (2011) note (in their Table 6.3) that individuals with parents 
who were problem gamblers (as defined by their adult child in GPS) were themselves five 
times more likely to be problem gamblers (as defined by DSM). But it is not sufficient that 
the instrument be correlated with the endogenous variable. It must also be the case that the 
only transmission route by which Parental PG affects W is through its effect on PG.  In the 
just identified case, whether or not the instrument has a direct effect on the dependent 
variable of interest rather than just via the endogenous variable, is not something that can be 
readily inferred, so the validity of the instrument(s) remains an article of faith. One might 
argue that parental PG in the past has an effect on current own well-being apart than through 
its effect through own PG which, if true, would undermine its use as an instrument. This is 
clearly a very credible criticism of the use of parental PG as an IV for own PG.  In our 
defence the difference in W for those with ParentalPG=1 compared to 0 is statistically 
insignificant in the raw data.  
It has been argued that, in the over-identified case, where there already exists one or 
more valid instruments, it is possible to test validity of a second instrument, conditional on 
the validity of a first instrument, using the Sargan–Hansen test (see Sargan, 1958, and 
Hansen, 1982). It seems likely that the PGSI score is a valid IV for PG, as defined by the 
DSM screen since both screens have been designed with the objective of assigning PG status 
and inspection of the questions in Appendix D suggest a lot of overlap across the two screens. 
Indeed, the overlap is so great that our conclusions do not depend greatly on which we use 
(see Appendix A for PGSI results).  
Moreover, even though parental PG is found to be a statistically valid IV, and so 
yields a consistent estimate of the effect of PG on W, there is still the question of how one 
interprets the resulting estimate. In a model with heterogeneous effects, while OLS estimation 
yields a biased estimate of the average effect of PG on W, this is not the case with IV. While 
an IV estimate is unbiased, IV does not necessarily yield an estimate of an average effect in 
the same way as OLS does. In particular, IV estimates are best interpreted as the causal effect 
of the treatment (in our case, PG) on individuals who are treated by virtue of the instrument. 
This is referred to as a local average treatment effect (LATE) in the literature. In our PG case, 
exogenous variation in PG occurs only for the group of individuals who become PG by virtue 
of parental PG – the so-called complier group.  
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Some applied econometricians have argued that, while we do not necessarily obtain 
an estimate of the average effect of the treatment in question on a readily identifiable 
population we nonetheless estimate something that is still relevant for policy. In contrast 
others argue that a LATE estimate is not useful and we need to augment it with something 
else to produce economically meaningful parameters (e.g. a structural econometric model). In 
our case, unlike the case of a schooling reform instrument used in Harmon and Walker (1995) 
in search of the causal effect of education on wages, it is difficult to argue that the adults 
were so affected by parental PG that they became PG themselves, especially because this 
group is so small. In particular, it is quite conceivable that Parental PG makes some people 
more likely to be PG (compliers) through some common environment or even genes. But is 
also possible that there are defiers – people who observe their parents were PG and were 
determined not to become like that. Formally, IV LATE estimates are the weighted average 
of the defier and complier estimates. Ideally we would like to pursue a matching 
methodology to attempt to support the IV estimates. However, since the PG group is so very 
small it is not likely that we would ever be able to get good matches. Similarly, one might 
like to pursue the bounding idea in Altonji, Elder and Taber (2006). However, again the 
treatment group is so small the bounds will inevitably be huge.  
In the specification using both PGSI score and parental problem gambling as 
instruments we test the validity of our instruments using Hansen’s J-test for over-
identification and this fails to reject the null hypothesis that our first-stage instruments are 
valid. However, the Hansen test (and earlier Sargan test) are not generally applicable in the 
context of a model where there are heterogeneous effects. Fortunately, we do not have to rely 
on this test because Table 3 suggests that nothing much hangs on the case for using Parental 
PG as an IV – we get the same results when we drop Parental PG and use the alternative 
PGSI score as the only instrument. The welfare relevant parameter, δ/γ, is virtually the same 
in both columns. The suggestion is that it is measurement error in PG that accounts for much 
of the bias in the OLS estimate in column 1 of Table 2. This is fortunate since it implies that 
we can extrapolate from our IV estimates. Thus, if we take δ/γ to be -5.75 then this implies an 
average welfare effect of around £170k pppa which we can then aggregate to approximately 
£56b pa.20 
                                                          
20 We find that dropping non-gamblers, or including a dummy variable for non-gamblers, makes no difference 
to the results in Table 3. 
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We also re-estimated Table 3 including exactly the same set of exogenous variables in 
both first and second stages. The second stage results of the relevant parameters were almost 
identical to the ones provided above. We also explored the sensitivity of our results, in 
column 1 of Table 2, to how income is defined. We have two choices in the BGPS data – 
individual net income, or household net income. The tables here use (log) household level 
income. Replacing this by (predicted log) individual level income (again from an interval 
regression), we find a slightly smaller income effect. However, household income is 
approximately double the level of individual level and so the corresponding welfare loss 
measures, using the household definition, are somewhat larger than we found with individual 
income.21 For example, using predicted log individual income the aggregate CV for the basic 
OLS specification is £21b rather than £31b. If we use the (log of) the midpoint of the bin 
which each individual reports (whether at individual or at household level) yield much 
smaller estimates than when use the predicted log from the interval regression. This is to be 
expected and the large difference is indicative of considerable measurement error in the raw 
binned data as well as the inappropriateness of using the midpoint when the raw income data 
is highly left skewed. So we strongly prefer the estimates reported in this section.  
A further issue, is the appropriateness of the definition of PG itself. The DSM (and 
PGSI) score comes from simply adding up the responses to each question, so attributing them 
with equal weight in terms of their effect on well-being. A simple alternative would be to 
allow the data to decide by including controls for each of the 10 (9) questions. Doing this we 
find that only one of the 10 DSM questions has a statistically significant effect on W: Q5 
which, not surprisingly, asks “Have you gambled to escape from problems …” and we find 
that a test of the joint insignificance of the remaining questions fails to reject. If we then 
dropped the insignificant questions, so that PG is defined simply by Q5, and instrument that 
with the PGSI score (without also including Parental PG) then we get a coefficient of -0.85 
(0.26), or (with including Parental PG) -0.88 (0.26) – larger (if only slightly so) than Table 3 
suggests. 
 
                                                          
21 A minor problem with household income is that there is a coding mistake in the raw data that cannot be fixed 
– two different income bins shared the same code on the income showcard. One solution to this problem is to 
recode the observations that chose either of these two codes as missing. Two alternatives would be to check by 
adding up the (midpoint of the binned) individual level data and replace accordingly; or, similarly, use STATAs 
missing values routine to construct a replacement exploiting the relationship between household and individual 
incomes in the data. None of these methods made any effective difference to our estimates. 
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Finally, Table 4 presents the Ordered Probit results in the first column and the 
Ordered Probit with instrumented PG. Ordered Probit treats the dependent variable as ordinal 
so the transformation of W is no longer relevant to the estimates, apart from the cut points.  






PGSI and Parental PG 
Ln Y (𝜸𝜸) 0.184*** 0.184*** 
 
(0.0292) (0.0292) 
PG (𝜹𝜹) -1.232*** -1.231*** 
 
(0.297) (0.296) 
𝜹𝜹/𝜸𝜸 -6.683*** -6.678*** 
 
(1.9750) (1.9703) 
Marginal Effects, 𝜟𝜟𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏(𝑾𝑾 = 𝟏𝟏, … ,𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏) /𝜟𝜟𝜟𝜟𝑮𝑮 
W=1 0.046*** 0.046*** 
 
(0.0117) (0.0117) 
2 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 
(0.0058) (0.0058) 
3 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 
(0.0062) (0.0061) 
4 0.027*** 0.027*** 
 
(0.0070) (0.0070) 
5 0.116*** 0.116*** 
 
(0.0280) (0.0289) 
6 0.061*** 0.061*** 
 
(0.0151) (0.0150) 
7 0.121*** 0.121*** 
 
(0.0294) (0.0293) 
8 0.044*** 0.044*** 
 
(0.0116) (0.0116) 
9 -0.101*** -0.101*** 
 
(0.0245) (0.0244) 
10 -0.359*** -0.359*** 
 
(0.0865) (0.0862) 
CV (£b, pa) 65.4 65.4 
 
Notes: Corresponding estimates where PG is defined using the PGSI screen, and then instrumented by 
the DSM score, is provided in the PGSI Appendix Table A7. The first stage results, and the 
coefficients of all of the controls in the second stage, are reported in Table A4. Female, age, age2, and 
ethnicity are included as control variables and their coefficients are not reported here. Estimated 





However, interpretation is more difficult in the context of Ordered Probit since the 
marginal effects of LnY and PG rely on these parameters, and on the cut point estimates 
which are not  reported. For any cardinalisation of W, we would expect PG to lower the 
probability of high W and increase the probability of low W. Using Ordered Probit to estimate 
the annual cost of lost welfare to afflicted individuals is slightly more involved than in the 
OLS (or other) cases. Similar to the OLS and IV cases, we take the ratio of estimated 
marginal effects of ln(Y) and PG on W and multiply by the proportion of afflicted individuals, 
mean income and population size. However, these must be calculated using the marginal 
effects and mean income for each value of W to correctly estimate the cost. 
The marginal effects reported in the bottom half of Table 4 describe the effects of PG 
on the probability that W=1, 2…..,10. There are positive significant effects of PG=1 (as 
opposed to 0) on the probability of having low W, and negative effects on the probability that 
W is high.  Figure 6 plots the probability of W = 1, 2, 3…,10 at the averages of the other 
explanatory variables, for the PG = 1 and 0 groups, using the estimates from the bottom half 
of column 2 of Table 4. The figure also shows the confidence intervals around these predicted 
probabilities of being at each level of W by PG. The PG = 0 group is much larger so the 
confidence intervals are much tighter. Nonetheless, the estimates separate the groups very 
well. There are statistically significantly larger probabilities of PG = 1 individuals having 
values of W below 7 compared to PG = 0 individuals; and significantly larger probabilities of 
PG = 0 individuals having values of W above 7 compared to PG=1 individuals22.  The cost 
estimates provided in Table 4, of £65b, are the summation of this calculation for W=1,…,10, 
weighted by the proportion of our sample who report each well-being level. 
  
                                                          
22 Extending the IV analysis to the ordered Probit case is not straightforward. Chesher and Smolinski (2012) 
show that control function methods in this case impose unrealistic restrictions, and are set, rather than point, 
identified. However, they show that this problem becomes less severe the less discrete the dependent variable is. 
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Figure 6 Predicted probabilities of W=1,2,3…, 10  for PG=0 and PG=1 at means.   
 
5.4 Mediation analysis 
In this sub-section we address the extent to which the loss in well-being associated 
with being a PG is “mediated” through the expenditure on gambling, by type of gambling. 
Note that our concerns about the causal status of our baseline estimate also apply to the 
mediation analysis. In particular gambling expenditure may itself, be endogenous. Our single 
cross section offers no realistic way of overcoming this problem and we follow Huber (2016) 
in adopting a simple least squares approach which identifies the direct effect of the mediating 
variable(s) though adding it (them) to a linear specification, like our baseline in Table 2, and 
noting their direct effect, while the indirect effect is recovered from the change in the PG 
coefficient when the mediator is added.  
Table 5 presents the main categories of gambling that we observe in the data, broken 
down into non-PG gamblers and gamblers who are PG. It is clear that total monthly spending 
for PGs exceed that for non-PGs by a factor of 14 overall. While lotto is less than double, PG 
spend on scratchcards is close to ten-fold higher, and casino spending is more than 30-fold 
and gaming machines (dominated by FOBTs) is close to 50-fold larger. Sadly, while we find 
that scratchcards and lotto spend gross-up to be almost exactly the same as industry level 
figures, the same is not true of the other gambling spending figures - we suspect that there is 
considerable error in these. 
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Table 5: Monthly average gambling expenditure, £ (std dev), by product and PG status 
 
Non-PG PG All 
National Lottery 7.877 14.190 5.925 
 
(14.1804) (18.9693) (12.7827) 
Scratchcards 1.247 12.880 1.015 
 
(3.9229) (25.0682) (4.1385) 
Gaming machines in bookmakers 0.859 43.860 0.951 
 
(16.4600) (151.5173) (19.3868) 
Sports 4.757 131.490 4.464 
 
(35.2369) (264.9388) (39.1756) 
Bingo 1.845 2.190 1.380 
 
(13.6891) (5.7008) (11.8069) 
Casino 1.006 34.470 0.992 
 
(16.9366) (145.3036) (19.2203) 
Other 4.387 68.990 3.740 
 
(28.6207) (113.5953) (27.0399) 
Notes: Gaming machines in bookmaker shops will include both FOBTs and other classes of “fruit” 
machines. “Sports” includes betting on sports events, football pools, betting on dog races, and betting on 
horse races. “Casino” includes online and offline expenditure. 
 
The mediation results are presented in Table 6 where the baseline column is taken 
from Table 2. In specification 1 we aggregate all gambling expenditure to form the mediator; 
while in specifications 2 and 3 we consider expenditure on two of the most popular gambling 
products, lotto and scratch cards, individually as mediators. In each case, expenditures are 
measured in £/month. Only in specification 3 do our results tentatively suggest that 
expenditure on scratch cards plays a mediating role in the loss in wellbeing associated with 
problem gambling. The direct effect of PG on W is £27.8b in aggregate. The indirect effect is 
only significant at the 10% level, but the magnitude of the effect, -0.177, represents almost 
13% of the total effect (𝛿𝛿 in column 1). Thus, there is a potential for these results to support 
policy that decreases scratchcard sales, perhaps through regulatory actions that raise the price 
of such games relative to others that seem benign, such as lotto. However, we know nothing 
about the demand elasticity for scatchcards and we do not know whether a reduction in their 
demand would increase the demand for lotto, or for other gambling which may not be as 
benign as our estimate suggests because we suspect that it is heavily attenuated towards zero 
















Ln Y (𝜸𝜸) 0.442*** 0.442*** 0.435*** 0.434*** 
 
(0.0546) (0.0545) (0.0547) (0.0546) 
PG (𝜹𝜹) -1.408*** -1.437*** -1.274*** -1.231*** 
 
(0.3656) (0.3816) (0.3894) (0.3759) 
𝜹𝜹/𝜸𝜸 -3.186*** -3.247*** -2.927*** -2.838*** 
 (0.9285) (0.9613) (0.9715) (0.9410) 
All gambling expenditure - 0.0001 - - 
  (0.0002)   
Other gambling expenditure - - 0.0002 - 
   (0.0002)  
Lotto expenditure - - 0.001 - 
   (0.0017)  
Scratchcard expenditure - - -0.017** -0.015** 
   (0.0072) (0.0071) 








CV (£b, pa) 31.2 31.8 28.7 27.8 
 
Our reservations about the causal interpretation of our PG effect on W applies to our 
mediation analysis too. In particular, gambling spending and its composition might be a result 
of low well-being. Given our inability to resolve the problem of reverse causation in the 
earlier work, we feel that we are not able to resolve this additional concern with the existing 
data.  
6. Conclusion 
Problem gambling is thought to affect a small proportion of the adult population but 
the contribution of this paper is to quantify how much of a problem PG is for those who are 
afflicted. Our baseline estimates were in excess of £31 billion pa – around 1½ % of GNP. 
Further estimates, allowing for measurement error and the endogeneity of PG, appear to be 
more than twice as large the baseline case. Various robustness checks failed to persuade us 
that the overall harm would be less than the headline estimate. Using a nonlinear Ordered 
Probit model generates even slightly higher estimates - although any of these estimates would 
imply that the PG problem swamps the tax revenues from gambling, by an order of 
magnitude. So we think of the baseline estimates as the lower bound of the likely range of 
social costs, and even this bound suggests that PG is an enormous social problem. 
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Unfortunately, we are not able to provide any direct comparisons with the previous literature 
or with alternative methodologies.23 
Given the potential size of this problem it would be important to design the policy 
response to it by exploring the transmission mechanism by which PG develops. Only if the 
transmission of PG was mediated via gambling expenditure may it then make sense to use 
gambling tax policy to reduce the extent of transmission. Even if this were the case this 
would not necessarily imply that gambling should be made illegal, or even taxed more 
heavily. There is the additional consideration of the consumer surplus enjoyed by players - 
the overwhelming majority of which appear to experience little or no problem with this 
activity. If we interpret our estimates of the loss in well-being associated with PG in the spirit 
of Orphanides and Zervos (1995), then our average estimate already incorporates the positive 
well-being enjoyed by those who are lucky enough to gamble without regret. If one were not 
prepared to accept this interpretation then the cross section work in Farrell and Walker (2000) 
and the time series work reported in Walker and Wheeler (2016) provide estimates of the 
price elasticity of demand for lotto that would imply that the consumer surplus enjoyed by 
lotto players is in the order of £1 billion pa. If we could extrapolate from this to the rest of 
gambling spending, then the aggregate consumer surplus across all forms of gambling would 
still be very small in comparison with the welfare losses reported here24.  
Nonetheless, taxing gambling more highly would only be part of the solution to the 
PG problem if gambling expenditure was an important mediator for PG. The lottery draw and 
scratchcard spending in the GPS data does suggest a correlation with PG: PG=1 individuals 
spend around twice as much on lottery draw games as do PG=0, and around 10 times as 
much on scratchcards25.  In addition, as Forrest (2014) points out, we would need to be able 
                                                          
23 However Forrest (2016), while not addressing the range of econometric issues that are of concern here, 
supports our conclusion that the PG problem is a very serious one by showing that his estimates of PG on well-
being for men was of a similar order of magnitude as that of being a widower, relative to being married. Indeed, 
for women, he found that, the effect of PG on W was even larger than that of being a widow on W. 
24 However, the take-out for non-lottery forms of gambling are subject to take out rates that would typically be 
less than 10% so we might be underestimating the consumer surplus enjoyed through these other sources of 
gambling. 
25 BGPS contains data on monthly spending, reported in intervals, for every type of gambling for those that say 
they engage in each type. The lottery draw spending grosses up, using the bin mid-points, to £3.20b, almost 
exactly matching the official annual sales (of £3.16b), but the scratchcard spending underestimates official sales 
(of £1.34b) by approximately 14%. Respondents are allowed to say that they would prefer not to say how much 
they spend and this is not an insubstantial proportion of those that report buying scratchcards in the last year. It 
is likely that these refusniks are larger than average spenders and we do not capture this in our calculations 




to argue that the elasticity of gambling demand was high, especially for those with PG26. The 
absence of evidence that taxation would reduce expenditure and that expenditure matters 
causally for PG is an important priority for future work. In any event, given the highly 
skewed nature of PG, there may be a case for trying to profile problem gamblers and apply 
treatments that do not rely on financial incentives solely to those that have a high probability 
of PG, rather than imposing some policy intervention onto the population as a whole, 
especially when doing so would harm the overwhelming majority of non-PG cases. Sadly, 
our reduced-form work shows that there are very few variables that are significantly 
indicative of PG.  
Our exploratory mediation results suggest that scratchcards may play a mediating role 
in the impact of PG on well-being, while other products do not, which suggests a role for 
policy that generates substitution effects towards more benign products. However, 
measurement error implies that we can say nothing about the role of other forms of gambling. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
PG=1 and PG=0 individuals. PG=1 spend £308 per month and lotto is 5% of this. While PG=0 spend £16 per 
month and lotto accounts for around 35% of this. Investigating the extent to which expenditure, and its 
composition, is an important part of the transmission mechanism that determines PG is a topic for future 
research. 
26 Intuitively, we would expect addicted consumers to be exhibit less elastic demand. So taxation might have 
little effect on the behaviour of addicts but nonetheless cause a large deadweight loss on those who are not 
addicted. While estimates of the average elasticity for various types of gambling do exist (see the report by 
Frontier Economics, 2014), there appear to none that allow for heterogeneity across the distribution of 
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Appendix A: Auxiliary Estimates 
Table A1: Interval regression estimates of log household income. 
Dependent variable Ln(Household Income) 
Age 0.0210*** (0.00422) 
Age2 -0.000201*** (4.40e-05) 
Female -0.302*** (0.0974) 
Education Qualifications: NQF 1 0.474*** (0.0339) 
NQF 2  0.309*** (0.0387) 
NQF 3 0.690*** (0.0379) 
NQF 5 0.472*** (0.0433) 
NQF 6 0.650*** (0.0553) 
NQF 7 0.734*** (0.0665) 
Mixed Ethnicity -0.394*** (0.122) 
Asian/Asian British -0.386*** (0.0589) 
Black/Black British -0.595*** (0.0773) 
Chinese/Other -0.174 (0.137) 
Unemployed -0.957*** (0.0618) 
Long-term Disability -0.932*** (0.0634) 
Family Carer -0.490*** (0.0405) 
Retired -0.475*** (0.0425) 
Good Health -0.129*** (0.0254) 
Fair Health -0.246*** (0.0338) 
Bad Health -0.246***(0.0589) 
Very Bad Health -0.209* (0.112) 
Separated/Divorced -0.395*** (0.0599) 
Single -0.276*** (0.0441) 
Widowed -0.287*** (0.0872) 
Constant 9.979*** (0.153) 
Observations 4,540 
Notes: Omitted categories: Male, education level 0 (NQF0=1), white, paid work, very good health, 
married. ***/**/* indicates statistically significant at 1%/5%/10%. Government office region and 





Table A2: Full OLS estimated coefficients (PG defined by DSM>2). 





Ln Y (𝛾𝛾) 0.442*** 0.0888*** 4.162*** 
 
(0.0546) (0.0112) (0.613) 
PG (𝛿𝛿) -1.408*** -0.293*** -13.77*** 
 
(0.366) (0.0885) (3.564) 
Age -0.0374*** -0.00563*** -0.469*** 
 
(0.00855) (0.00169) (0.0989) 
Age2 0.000507*** 7.82e-05*** 0.00636*** 
 
(8.47e-05) (1.67e-05) (0.000981) 
Female 0.218*** 0.0360*** 2.541*** 
 
(0.0454) (0.00881) (0.534) 
Mixed Ethnicity -0.764*** -0.127** -9.565*** 
 
(0.260) (0.0621) (2.690) 
Asian/Asian British -0.254* -0.0416 -2.808* 
 
(0.137) (0.0273) (1.575) 
Black/Black British -0.0487 -0.00119 -1.097 
 
(0.161) (0.0330) (1.853) 
Chinese/Other -0.169 -0.000327 -3.236 
 
(0.275) (0.0401) (3.491) 
Married 0.417*** 0.0522*** 5.931*** 
 
(0.0779) (0.0155) (0.882) 
Separated/Divorced -0.0252 -0.000951 -0.703 
 
(0.103) (0.0209) (1.148) 
Widowed -0.529*** -0.0831*** -6.741*** 
 
(0.130) (0.0266) (1.465) 
Constant 3.566*** 1.142*** 10.92* 
 
(0.557) (0.114) (6.278) 
𝜹𝜹/𝜸𝜸 -3.186*** -3.298*** -3.308*** 
 (0.9285) (1.0876) (1.0003) 
CV (£b, pa) 31.2 32.3 32.4 
Observations 6,942 6,942 6,942 
R-squared 0.065 0.050 0.067 
Notes: Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. ***/**/* indicates statistically significant at 
1%/5%/10%. Omitted categories: Male, white, single. CV is computed by multiplying the 
estimated δ/γ by 0.0072*46m*𝑌𝑌�: where 𝑌𝑌� = £29,560; 0.0072 is the proportion with PG=1, 46m is 
the adult population, and CV is recorded in £ billion pa. The estimated value of λ in the final 






Table A3: OLS estimated coefficients (PG defined by PGSI>7) 





        
Ln Y (𝛾𝛾) 0.441*** 0.0886*** 4.170*** 
 
(0.0545) (0.0112) (0.615) 
PG (𝛿𝛿) -1.337*** -0.298*** -12.81*** 
 
(0.428) (0.108) (4.021) 
Age -0.0365*** -0.00544*** -0.462*** 
 
(0.00856) (0.00169) (0.0993) 
Age2 0.000500*** 7.66e-05*** 0.00631*** 
 
(8.48e-05) (1.67e-05) (0.000985) 
Female 0.223*** 0.0370*** 2.604*** 
 
(0.0454) (0.00881) (0.535) 
Mixed Ethnicity -0.760*** -0.126** -9.563*** 
 
(0.261) (0.0621) (2.700) 
Asian/Asian British -0.263* -0.0432 -2.901* 
 
(0.137) (0.0273) (1.584) 
Black/Black British -0.0470 -0.000676 -1.087 
 
(0.160) (0.0330) (1.858) 
Chinese/Other -0.165 0.000371 -3.207 
 
(0.275) (0.0401) (3.502) 
Married 0.415*** 0.0516*** 5.928*** 
 
(0.0780) (0.0155) (0.886) 
Separated/Divorced -0.0342 -0.00293 -0.792 
 
(0.103) (0.0209) (1.153) 
Widowed -0.532*** -0.0837*** -6.783*** 
 
(0.130) (0.0266) (1.470) 
Constant 3.545*** 1.139*** 10.72* 
 
(0.556) (0.113) (6.293) 
𝛿𝛿/𝛾𝛾 -3.029*** -3.360** -3.071*** 
 (1.0466) (1.2964) (1.0762) 
CV (£b, pa) 22.6 25.0 22.9 
Observations 6,942 6,942 6,942 
R-squared 0.064 0.049 0.066 
Notes: Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. ***/**/* indicates 
statistically significant at 1%/5%/10%. Omitted categories: Male, white, single. 
CV is computed by multiplying the estimated δ/γ by 0.0055*46m*𝑌𝑌�: where 𝑌𝑌� ≈£15,500; 0.0055 is the proportion with PG=1; 46m is the adult population: and 
CV is recorded in £ billion pa. The estimated value of λ in the final column is 2.27 






Table A4: First-stage coefficient estimates of PG (opposite score and parental gambling) 
Dependent Variable DSM>2 DSM>2 DSM>2 PGSI>7 PGSI>7 PGSI>7 
PGSI Score 0.048*** - 0.048*** - - - 
 
(0.0041) - (0.0041) - - - 
DSM Score - - - 0.092*** - 0.092*** 
 
- - - (0.0109) - (0.0109) 
Parents did not  - -0.001 0.001 - -0.002 0.001 
gamble - (0.0023) (0.0020) - (0.0020) (0.0017) 
Parents were PG - 0.031** 0.014* - 0.024** 0.007 
 
- (0.0127) (0.0082) - (0.0112) (0.0071) 
Age -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Age2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Female 0.000 -0.009*** 0.000 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.001 
 
(0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0014) 
Mixed Ethnicity -0.011 -0.010*** -0.011 -0.007 -0.008*** -0.007 
 
(0.0075) (0.0026) (0.0071) (0.0045) (0.0023) (0.0042) 
Asian/British Asian 0.006 0.013 0.006 -0.001 0.009 -0.001 
 
(0.0063) (0.0094) (0.0060) (0.0045) (0.0074) (0.0044) 
Black/British Black 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.003 0.010 0.004 
 
(0.0062) (0.0105) (0.0062) (0.0065) (0.0105) (0.0066) 
Chinese/Other -0.008* -0.010*** -0.008* -0.005 -0.006*** -0.005 
 
(0.0050) (0.0028) (0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0021) (0.0046) 
Married 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 
(0.0030) (0.0040) (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0029) 
Separated/Divorced 0.005 0.001 0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 
(0.0039) (0.0054) (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0048) (0.0034) 
Widowed -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.006** -0.005 -0.006** 
 
(0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0028) 
NQF1 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.004** 0.002 0.004** 
 
(0.0025) (0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0020) 
NQF2 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 
 
(0.0030) (0.0038) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0026) 
NQF3 0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.003 
 
(0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0024) 
NQF5 0.002 -0.000 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.0029) (0.0041) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0035) (0.0025) 
NQF6 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.004 0.001 
 
(0.0042) (0.0061) (0.0041) (0.0037) (0.0051) (0.0039) 
NQF7 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002 
 
(0.0054) (0.0071) (0.0055) (0.0037) (0.0057) (0.0038) 
Unemployed 0.003 0.017 0.003 0.008 0.021* 0.008 
 
(0.0081) (0.0108) (0.0080) (0.0088) (0.0118) (0.0085) 
Long-term disability 0.005 0.002 0.005 -0.008* -0.007 -0.008* 
 (0.0049) (0.0064) (0.0051) (0.0042) (0.0057) (0.0043) 
Caring for family 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.0022) (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0019) 
      Contd. 
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Table A4 Contd: First-stage coefficient estimates of PG (opposite score and parental gambling)  
Dependent Variable DSM>2 DSM>2 DSM>2 PGSI>7 PGSI>7 PGSI>7 
Retired 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.003* -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0017) 
Good health 0.002 0.006** 0.002 0.001 0.004** 0.001 
 
(0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0014) 
Fair health -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.005** 0.007*** 0.005** 
 
(0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0023) 
Bad health -0.001 0.008 -0.001 0.013*** 0.016** 0.013*** 
 
(0.0036) (0.0056) (0.0035) (0.0044) (0.0069) (0.0043) 
Very bad health -0.010 -0.002 -0.011* 0.019 0.017 0.018 
 
(0.0067) (0.0036) (0.0064) (0.0118) (0.0140) (0.0128) 
Constant -0.004 0.035*** -0.006 -0.015* 0.015* -0.016** 
 
(0.0089) (0.0107) (0.0086) (0.0075) (0.0088) (0.0075) 
       Observations 6,942 6,942 6,942 6,942 6,942 6,942 
R-squared 0.422 0.017 0.423 0.410 0.017 0.410 
Notes: Estimated standard errors, obtained by bootstrapping, are in parentheses. ***/**/* indicates statistically 
significant at 1%/5%/10%. Omitted categories: Parents gambled but were not PG, male, white, single, NQF level 





Table A5: Full IV estimated coefficients (PG defined by DSM>2) 








Dependent variable W W W 
       
Ln Y (𝛾𝛾) 0.437*** 0.437*** 0.361*** 
 
(0.0526) (0.0570) (0.0841) 
PG (𝛿𝛿) -2.512*** -2.527*** -20.115** 
 
(0.6498) (0.6517) (9.5738) 
Age -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.050*** 
 
(0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0121) 
Age2 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Female 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.019 
 
(0.0480) (0.0461) (0.1192) 
Mixed Ethnicity -0.776*** -0.776*** -0.967*** 
 
(0.2667) (0.2648) (0.2800) 
Asian/Asian British -0.240* -0.240* -0.012 
 
(0.1419) (0.1362) (0.2305) 
Black/Black British -0.042 -0.041 0.076 
 
(0.1568) (0.1593) (0.2888) 
Chinese/Other -0.179 -0.179 -0.329 
 
(0.2693) (0.2744) (0.2964) 
Married 0.415*** 0.415*** 0.381*** 
 
(0.0788) (0.0814) (0.1121) 
Separated/Divorced -0.024 -0.024 -0.008 
 
(0.1040) (0.1034) (0.1458) 
Widowed -0.534*** -0.534*** -0.600*** 
 
(0.1238) (0.1223) (0.1485) 
Constant 3.660*** 3.662*** 5.097*** 
 
(0.5468) (0.5787) (1.0687) 
𝛿𝛿/𝛾𝛾 -5.750*** -5.788*** -55.767* 
 (1.6888) (1.6462) (34.5181) 
CV (£b, pa) 56.3 56.7 546 
1st stage F 4904.66*** 1640.35*** 17.23*** 
Observations 6,942 6,942 6,942 
R-squared 0.066 0.066 0.066 
Notes: Female, age, age2, and ethnicity are included as control variables and their 
coefficients are not reported here. Estimated standard errors, obtained from 
bootsrapping, are in parentheses.. ***/**/* indicates statistically significant at 
1%/5%/10%. CV is computed by multiplying the estimated δ/γ by 0.072 * 46m * 𝑌𝑌�, 
where 𝑌𝑌� = £26,560, 0.072 is the proportion with PG=1, 46m is the adult population, 







Table A6: IV estimated coefficients (PG defined by PGSI>7) 
Dependent Variable W W W 
       
Ln Y (𝛾𝛾) 0.432*** 0.432*** 0.278*** 
 
(0.0552) (0.0577) (0.1023) 
PG (𝛿𝛿) -3.588*** -3.597*** -38.593*** 
 
(0.9008) (0.9188) (11.8881) 
Age -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.039** 
 
(0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0154) 
Age2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Female 0.207*** 0.207*** -0.044 
 
(0.0479) (0.0463) (0.1020) 
Mixed Ethnicity -0.780*** -0.780*** -1.089*** 
 
(0.2843) (0.2598) (0.2789) 
Asian/Asian British -0.245* -0.245* 0.022 
 
(0.1429) (0.1381) (0.2634) 
Black/Black British -0.027 -0.027 0.275 
 
(0.1725) (0.1601) (0.3951) 
Chinese/Other -0.179 -0.179 -0.393 
 
(0.2836) (0.2745) (0.2957) 
Married 0.405*** 0.405*** 0.254* 
 
(0.0775) (0.0779) (0.1524) 
Separated/Divorced -0.047 -0.047 -0.245 
 
(0.1036) (0.1016) (0.1906) 
Widowed -0.544*** -0.544*** -0.738*** 
 
(0.1317) (0.1304) (0.1795) 
Constant 3.687*** 3.687*** 5.945*** 
 
(0.5568) (0.5783) (1.2095) 
𝛿𝛿/𝛾𝛾 -8.307*** -8.329*** -138.614* 
 (2.3881) (1.9309) (78.3446) 
CV (£b, pa) 61.8 62.0 1,030 
Observations 6,942 6,942 6,942 
R-squared 0.069 0.069 0.069 
Notes: In the first column PG is instrumented using the DSM score, while in the 
second column it is instrumented with DSM score using GMM estimation. In the 
final column we instrument with parental problem gambling as well as DSM. 
Female, age, age2, marital status, and ethnicity are included as control variables. 
Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. ***/**/* indicates statistically 
significant at 1%/5%/10%. CV is computed by multiplying the estimated δ/γ by 
0.0055*46m*𝑌𝑌�, where 𝑌𝑌� = £29,560, 0.0055 is the proportion with PG=1, and is 






Table A7: Ordered Probit estimated parameters of interest (PG defined by PGSI>7) 
Dependent Variable W W 
      
Ln Y (𝛾𝛾) 0.183*** 0.183*** 
 
(0.0292) (0.0292) 
PG (𝛿𝛿) -1.635*** -1.634*** 
 
(0.316) (0.316) 
𝛿𝛿/𝛾𝛾 -8.939*** -8.936*** 
 
(2.2760) (2.2761) 
Marginal Effects, 𝛥𝛥 Pr(𝑊𝑊 = 1, … ,10) /𝛥𝛥𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)  
   
W=1 0.060*** 0.060*** 
 
(0.0128) (0.0128) 
2 0.029*** 0.029*** 
 
(0.0066) (0.0066) 
3 0.031*** 0.031*** 
 
(0.0069) (0.0069) 
4 0.036*** 0.036*** 
 
(0.0078) (0.0078) 
5 0.154*** 0.153*** 
 
(0.0300) (0.0300) 
6 0.082*** 0.082*** 
 
(0.0163) (0.0163) 
7 0.161*** 0.161*** 
 
(0.0314) (0.0314) 
8 0.058*** 0.058*** 
 
(0.0128) (0.0128) 
9 -0.134*** -0.134*** 
 
(0.0263) (0.0263) 
10 -0.477*** -0.476*** 
 
(0.0921) (0.0921) 
CV (£b, pa) 66.5 66.5 
Notes: In the first column PG is instrumented with DSM 
score. In the second column we instrument with parental 
problem gambling as well as DSM. Female, age, age2, and 
ethnicity are included as control variables and their 
coefficients are not reported here. Estimated standard errors 
are in parentheses. ***/**/* indicates statistically significant 






Appendix B – DSM and PGSI Screens  
In DSM-IV respondents are asked the following 10 questions to determine whether or not they show 
signs of problem gambling. Respondents are asked how often they exhibit the behavior in each 
question (with options for never, some of the time, most times, every time). Answers ‘never’ and 
‘some of the time’ score 0, whilst ‘most times’ and ‘every time’ are scored as 1. A cumulative score 
of 3 or more from the following questions indicate a problem gambler. In the past 12 months:  
1. how often do you go back another day to win back money you lost? 
2. how often have you found yourself thinking about gambling? 
3. have you needed to gamble with more and more money to get the excitement you are looking 
for? 
4. have you felt restless or irritable when trying to cut down on gambling? 
5. have you gambled to escape from problems or when you are feeling depressed, anxious or 
bad about yourself? 
6. have you lied to family, or others, to hide the extent of your gambling? 
7. have you made unsuccessful attempts to control, cut back or stop gambling? 
8. have you committed a crime in order to finance gambling or to pay gambling debts? 
9. have you risked or lost an important relationship, job, educational or work opportunity 
because of gambling? 
10. have you asked others to provide money to help with a desperate financial situation caused by 
gambling?  
In PGSI respondents answer: never, sometimes, most of the time, or almost always (scoring as 0, 1, 2, 
3 respectively) to the following 9 questions. In the past 12 months, how often:  
1. have you bet more than you could really afford? 
2. have you needed to gamble with larger amounts of money to get the same excitement? 
3. have you gone back to try to win back the money you’d lost? 
4. have you borrowed money or sold anything to get money to gamble? 
5. have you felt that you might have a problem with gambling? 
6. have you felt that gambling has caused you any health problems, including stress or anxiety? 
7. have people criticised your betting, or told you that you have a gambling problem, whether or 
not you thought it is true? 
8. have you felt your gambling has caused financial problems for you or your household? 
9. have you felt guilty about the way you gamble or what happens when you gamble? 
The PGSI screen differs from DSM in that it attempts to assess the severity of the individual’s 
problem gambling. A score of 0 indicates non-problem gambling, 1-2 is assessed as a low level of 
problem gambling, 3-7 would indicate a moderate risk of becoming a problem gambler, and a score of 
8+ is typically used to define problem gambling.  
 
